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This paper summarizes the challenges identified at the 
MAMI Management and Measurement Summit (M3S) for 
network management with the increased deployment of 
encrypted traffic based on a set of use cases and 
deployed techniques (for network monitoring, 
performance enhancing proxies, firewalling as well as 
network-supported DDoS protection and migration), and 
provides recommendations for future use cases and the 
development of new protocols and mechanisms. In 
summary, network architecture and protocol design 
efforts should 
1. provide for independent measurability when 
observations may be contested, 
2. support different security associations at different 
layers, and 
3. replace transparent middleboxes with middlebox 
transparency in order to increase visibility, rebalance 
control and enable cooperation.  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Further information on the 
workshop can be found on the 
MAMI project website.
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In recent years, the increase in public concerns about 
surveillance of and interference with Internet traffic have led to 
a rapidly expanding deployment of encryption to protect end-
user privacy, mainly based on the use of HTTPS [RFC2818] 
and thereby TLS [RFC8446]. This evolution provides a step-
function increase to the protection of a user’s privacy and data. 
Still all information that is radiated from an endpoint may 
contain user-specific information and should be evaluated for 
its privacy implications.
Further, encryption can provide the sender of a packet with 
clear control of which data and information can be accessed by 
which entity, e.g., an on-path entity, at a specific protocol layer. 
Therefore, encryption also helps to address the ossification 
problem that has made it more and more difficult to deploy 
new protocols and protocol extensions using the Internet. The 
extension of the encryption boundary into the transport layer, 
beyond what TLS over TCP protects, as we see with QUIC, is 
the next step to protect even more information at even lower 
layers.
However, this move to enforce protection of lower-layer 
headers with encryption will also necessitate a change to the 
model that is often used today to provide in-network 
functionality. This functionality includes simple firewalling, 
DDoS protection, or performing enhancing services that may 
be performed with or without the explicit approval of one or 
both communication endpoints. More generally, these 
functions can be split into five classes regarding data access and 
exchange requirements:
• Explicit exposure of information for network consumption 
(where communication is end-to-end integrity protected, and 
no trust relationship with midpoint required);
• Split-transport proxying (where a higher layer is encrypted 
end-to-end, and lower layers are optionally encrypted with 
the midpoint as a communication end);
• Network to endpoint signaling (where the length of a 
“scratch” space can be end-to-end integrity protected, 
depending on the encryption this optionally requires a trust 
relationship);
• Full visibility, for content inspection without modification 
(where a trust relationship is required with at least one 
endpoint);
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• Content modification (where a trust relationship between 
both endpoints and the midpoint is required).
Based on this classification we can say that 
the motivation for encrypting data at 
different layers can be very different. If two 
layers are encrypted for the same reason, 
their security associations can share the 
same encryption envelope. However, if they 
encrypt for different reasons (e.g., one for application privacy, 
another for transport operational correctness), then there is an 
opportunity to encrypt them differently, or to even use 
different security associations for each layer with potentially 
even different communication endpoints. Otherwise, the 
functions listed above can become either unnecessarily 
restrictive or more information than necessary may be exposed. 
Instead, we should preserve the diversity of solutions and the 
ability of users to choose at each layer.
Even if different encryption envelopes are used to separate 
information accordingly, it should be noted, that it does not 
make sense for midpoints within the network, which do 
content inspection for security support, to provide partial 
visibility, e.g., visibility of data at only some of the layers. 
Encryption of the data at other layers may then hide the 
information to be monitored, therefore these functions will 
always need to see all data.
An IAB document [ID.wire-image] further describes 
implications to the integrity and confidentiality protection of 
the wire image of a network protocol, i.e. the information 
content derivable from passive observation of packets 
belonging to a communication.
Internet transport has always interacted with network 
operations to find and configure suitable network paths, and to 
ensure the network as a whole works well for customers and 
operators. Building any transport system requires careful 
engineering to achieve a good (and affordable) result. This 
holds for the Internet just as it does for physical transport 
systems such as the London Tube. The Tube system doesn’t 
“just work”; it requires constant maintenance and engineering 
support to deliver reliable and appropriate service. Transport 
protocol design needs to consider this deployment aspect as 
well.
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Impact on protocol evolution 
“What do you do when the endpoint 
can’t trust the network? And the 
network can’t trust the endpoint?”
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Transport layer header information has for a 
long time been used to support network 
operations, and the network operations 
community has in the past benefited from 
understanding the pattern and 
requirements of traffic passing through 
their networks, both at an aggregate and 
flow level [ID.encrypt]. For example, 
visibility of transport header information 
has allowed toolchains to be used and 
maintained that help understand customer 
quality of experience, detect performance or configuration 
issues, identify the root cause of issues and interactions, 
monitor the impact of changes in infrastructure/configuration 
and in response to changes in application traffic patterns.
New protocols should be designed by 
making appropriate use of authentication 
and encryption. Authentication protects 
the integrity of transport information and 
prevents undetected changes to the header 
information. Encryption provides 
confidentiality of the transport protocol header, preventing any 
on-path function from using information therein. However, 
increasing use of encryption will also reduce the ability of 
operators and researchers to measure compliance with 
transport specifications and interactions between protocol 
features and configurations to better understand the operation 
of the Internet as a whole. 
In the past, measurement data and experiments conducted 
using in-situ equipment have helped to understand design 
trade-offs, informed selection of appropriate mechanisms, and 
helped to ensure a safe, reliable, and robust Internet. The sort 
of measurements that are impacted by increasing 
confidentiality are not related to application development, 
where a test node can enable specific functions, e.g., share a 
key or make data public, but will impact any measurement at 
scale, and experiments that look at complex interactions 
between application flows, configuration, policy and coexisting 
traffic. 
This leads to questions about whether this trend will have an 
impact on transport evolution, which has in the past benefited 
from measurements within the network and insight provided 
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“Some level of encryption will likely 
form the basis of future protocol 
designs.” 
“Users may follow the law, attackers 
probably will not. We need models when 
analyzing security with a higher 
granularity than “an attacker” and “not 
an attacker” -- there are different users 
of networked systems, each of which 
have different incentives.”
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(often indirectly) by the network operations community: Could 
the long-term implications of this trend even change the 
motivation for designing common protocol specifications and 
the way in which research data is able to support 
standardisation? There is also a question of who bears the 
resulting costs that encryption could place upon the research 
community. Going forward, it will be important to understand 
that there are real risks to future innovation from these 
impediments when encryption is applied without considering 
the impacts on operations, research & development, and 
regulation.
We considered four major use cases for network management: 
network measurement for monitoring and troubleshooting, 
protection mechanisms such as firewalls, performance-
enhancing proxies, and in-network DDoS mitigation. More 
detailed information on each can be found online in the 
respective workshop slides.
Network Performance Monitoring 
Performance measurements can support a variety of activities: 
response to customer issues, monitoring when deploying new 
features, detection or response to anomalies, understanding 
where faults are located, or to support planning for investment 
and sustainability. 
A wide range of performance evaluation tools and 
measurement techniques has evolved over time for basic 
network monitoring. Many operators have added their own 
solutions over time, e.g., to measure RTT and throughput, that 
often rely on at least transport header information that is 
visible in clear with TCP. These tools are now well-understood 
and most tools are now trusted by operators, because they need 
to be relied upon them.
While it is good to see an increase in the pace of evolution, this 
comes either at additional cost in development of toolchains 
and operational procedures, or alternatively with a loss of detail 
that will change how the network service is offered. Some 
existing tools will not work with encrypted traffic. Other 
techniques, such as load-balancing, often rely on just the 5 
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tuple to be visible. These should still work with transport 
encryption, e.g. QUIC [ID.QUIC], but might also have limited 
usefulness for more complex scenarios. 
Services that operate on a per-user basis 
(e.g., mobile user equipment), can currently 
utilise measurements to augment 
information about subscribers, to add 
context about the service being used (e.g., 
to support Quality of Experience, QoE, 
evaluation), or to detect issues with specific 
parts of the infrastructure. For example, in 
mobile networks, flow-level metrics can be 
collected in the network within a GPRS 
Tunneling Protocol (GTP) tunnel, which 
allows measurements to follow the 
customer, and provides the identification 
necessary to associate measurements with 
specific equipment. Passive measurement 
can also be used to take a small number of 
samples. For example, one use could measure every 5 minutes, 
aggregating the statistics at the cell side, to observe 
throughput, half-RTT to track latency changes and infer 
congestion through queueing delay, or measure retransmissions 
to infer loss. These metrics can be correlated with layer 2 
impacts to provide evidence of subtle configuration issues with 
equipment. A key point is that measurement data of different 
granularity and captured at various vantage points throughout 
the network is necessary to support effective operation of the 
network. 
Measurements can help understand the 
impact of traffic. During peak evening 
hours, overall network congestion typically 
rises, with a correspondingly higher latency 
and higher retransmission rates. This is 
currently most noticeable on 3G networks, 
as these are often more congested and is 
less so on 4G networks. Drilling down by 
probe and network equipment provides an easy identification 
of the most congested network paths, and indication of the 
usage patterns that result in this. This method of analysis has 
repeatedly allowed network management teams to isolate 
network issues that typically do not show in the KPIs of 
individual routers or network hardware.
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“Sometimes the operator provides a bit 
pipe, then you care about bit pipe 
measurements. Sometimes you are a 
service provider, then the service-level 
metrics are important. This is not just 
perception of the role… lots of people 
think the network should be a dumb 
pipe, and that running the dumb pipe is 
easy. This is fundamentally a struggle 
over the value… This is not an obvious 
trade off.”
“Operators would like to know the speed 
experienced, whether there was 
congestion, where there is any “bad 
connectivity”, the achieved flow rate and 
jitter observed.”
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Passive measurements provide important performance data, 
but it is difficult to judge network speeds available to 
customers from passive measurements alone. A lot of user 
activity simply does not fully utilize the available speed. 
However, active measurement would be counterproductive for 
the busiest paths within networks, because these are precisely 
the paths where one does not want to add more traffic. Instead, 
it is common to look at customer satisfaction with the available 
bandwidth using passive monitoring. For example, a probe can 
sample the observed TCP goodput by region. A probability 
distribution function of the peak speeds can be used to predict 
where customers may be less satisfied. 
If a customer does happen to complain, measurement data 
helps with troubleshooting, e.g., to understand whether their 
complaint is likely to relate to network congestion issues. The 
peak speed probability distribution over time can also be an 
indication of the average speed experienced, but this is not 
necessarily so. Correlating inflection points with customer 
survey results helps to identify areas where network capacity 
should be improved (i.e., where subjective ratings tip from 
Good to Poor for regions where customers experience less than 
70%-80% of peak speed).
Encryption can hide measurement of the speed or performance 
actually achieved by a user. Many current passive measurement 
methods depend on seeing sequence numbers and ACKs, to 
follow the window size and make a judgement what determines 
the current window limitation: the network based on 
bandwidth limits or congestion; or the application above the 
transport that does have more data to send; or the transport’s 
flow control itself. It is not a general solution to simply reduce 
the available toolset for network monitoring to only use active 
measurements, because active measurements do not observe 
the actual performance as experienced by the user. This will 
become more difficult when traffic uses encrypted transports, 
such as QUIC. Future tools could use methods such as the spin 
bit, which is a simple explicit signal for passive estimation of 
latency. Such an approach of simple explicit signalling could 
also be developed to measure loss and congestion, and thereby 
estimate the evolution of the window size over time.
One important example that currently relies on this 
information is measurement of the expected video quality 
across a particular network segment. Current tools exist to 
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October 22, 2018
interpret the media rate of a streaming video session and to 
understand the quality of experience using a model based on 
subjective data by passively observing traffic. Such a model 
relies on key input information from the traffic such as content 
type, hostname, media container metadata, payload size, and 
transport dynamics to infer the network impact. An encrypted 
transport would hide application as well as transport 
information, such as the application payload size, sequence and 
acknowledgement numbers, retransmission. Also currently, 
DNS information can be used to augment these kind of 
measured data, however, the use of encrypted DNS would stop 
the use of these kind of information. Lack of quality 
information will not only provide challenges for the support of 
video traffic in general but can also be a barrier to entry for 
small content providers as the network may be optimized for 
large content providers only (in directly cooperation with 
them). 
Of course, some performance monitoring 
can also be done with independent QoS 
measurements (verification) once 
everything is encrypted (active 
measurements). This sort of measurement 
tool is often even appreciated by 
enterprises, as it can provide more detailed 
insights in the functioning and problems of 
a specific application. However, such an 
approach has higher costs and requires 
additional bandwidth resources and is 
therefore often only used for some 
dedicated services in addition to network 
monitoring.
Further, encryption can hide application 
decisions. For example, encrypting control 
traffic prevents measurements providing 
insight into the multiplexing part of a QUIC session, as one 
QUIC connection can carry multiple independent application 
services (e.g., audio and video, or additional control data). 
Encryption intentionally makes it more difficult to infer 
internals of the application design, but also hides likely 
interaction of different application services with changes in 
network conditions. This can make it impossible to know why 
the application traffic pattern changes in response to changes 
in the network. Such changes can occur very suddenly, e.g., 
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“Applying passive measurement to 
generate quality of experience metrics in 
the absence of transport information 
would require heuristics to infer the 
dynamics based on traffic patterns, with 
resulting assumptions about what the 
application may be trying to do, and 
what the implications are for the 
applications/network. These 
assumptions are necessarily brittle, and 
lead to lower-quality insights about 
 user-experienced performance.”
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when a new feature is enabled in an application (e.g. when a 
new version of QUIC is activated in Chrome browsers), and 
can have unexpected interactions with existing deployed 
equipment configurations in the network, requiring changes to 
the network configuration.
Looking forward, it is also important to realise that there are 
various communities seeking to understand network 
performance and issues. This includes not only operators, but 
researchers and developers wishing to use the network, 
information about whether customers receive the advertised 
service that they have subscribed to, and regulators seeking to 
see the bigger picture. Increased use of encryption will also 
have an impact on service verification.
The goal of a given performance 
measurement activity determines the set of 
metrics of interest. Even within an operator, 
there is a diversity of such goals. The faults 
reported also vary. For example, the first 
answer from a network operator asking 
about a problem may be, “the problem is 
with your network”. This means any 
operator really has to prove there is no 
problem in their own network segment, not 
just that packets are sent along the service. 
A balanced understanding of how the network is performing 
(or not) is not possible if only one party has access to these 
metrics. It becomes impossible to verify the applicability and 
veracity of those metrics. Open measurability at different 
places along the network path is therefore of the utmost 
importance in cases where there may be disagreement among 
parties about the parameters of the service provided. There are 
additional pressures on this: Some people have access to much 
more information than other people. This analytic data is 
important enough to people that it can be sold to those willing 
to pay.
Performance enhancing proxies 
An assumption of the Internet architecture is that any two 
cooperating endpoints can deploy a new application or 
transport layer protocol. However, the present Internet adds a 
set of third parties, middleboxes on the path between the 
 9
Reducing visibility can impact 
industry competition
“An inability to independently measure 
performance metrics leads to a business 
disadvantage -- if the media companies 
only cooperate on performance metrics 
with larger operators, smaller operators 
will be placed at a disadvantage. A 
danger emerges that favours companies 
that have large infrastructures.”
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endpoints. Many of these boxes implement in-network 
functions to improve performance of the transport when 
crossing low-performance links (high-loss, high-latency) or 
highly asymmetric links (narrow upstream bandwidth) 
[RFC3449]. Examples include, but are not limited to, satellite, 
mobile, and wireless access networks. To address this challenge 
Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) [RFC3135] are put on 
one or both ends of the low-quality/asymmetric link. Today, 
these proxies may either intercept the transport connection 
completely (“back to back termination”), or perform various of 
“tricks” with TCP headers such as ACK manipulation 
(suppression, reconstruction, compaction), receive window size 
manipulation, and sometimes header compression. 
While these middleboxes can address the problem of link 
asymmetry or packet loss, which is hard to address solely on an 
end-to-end bases, these approaches are also knowingly 
problematic as they make assumptions about the traffic flowing 
through them, and thereby impose limitation on protocol 
evolution: “All these middleboxes optimize current applications at the 
expense of future applications. In effect, future applications will often 
need to behave in a similar fashion to existing ones, in order to increase 
the chances of successful deployment. Further, the precise behavior of all 
these middleboxes is not clearly specified, and implementation errors 
make matters worse, raising the bar for the deployment of new 
technologies” [RFC6182]. 
This problem can be addressed by header encryption, which 
makes it impossible for on-path middleboxes to modify 
transport headers. This has a tradeoff in that any middlebox 
PEP functions are completely inhibited. For example, it is 
impossible to deploy an ACK-suppression scheme for QUIC, 
because acknowledgments in QUIC are encrypted. However, 
making PEPs go away does not make the problems they 
address go away.
In moving to encrypted transports, it is either necessary for the 
endpoints to handle diverse range of performance issues that 
arise from challenging network paths (e.g., highly asymmetric 
performance at network boundaries, intermittent reordering, 
loss, widely varying capacity, etc) or it is necessary to design 
“hooks” into these protocols in order to allow for limited PEP 
functionality. For example, QUIC could eventually be extended 
to support transport-split proxies while still maintaining end-
to-end encryption for payload and other control information. 
 10
October 22, 2018
Alternately, an approach using partial tunnels (e.g. semantically 
equivalent to HTTP CONNECT, but used for building UDP 
tunnels instead of TCP) and leveraging higher-layer awareness 
of performance diversity at network boundaries could 
potentially address some of these issues.
High resolution (live) video content is seen by a large number 
of viewers, therefore there are opportunities for delivery over 
multicast in the network. This can be very beneficial for saving 
bandwidth. In such a setup, multicast is sometimes already 
used from content provider to a home gateway where the home 
gateway is an HTTP proxy and multicast-to-HTTP/S-unicast 
transport translator. In such an example setup, the content 
playback function fetches the manifest file from content 
hosting and uses its content to retrieve the media. The gateway 
also acts as reverse proxy (with DNS interception) and 
therefore requires a certificate (but does not have a static IP 
address, so certificates should have a DNS name). Moreover, 
the gateway would need to change the manifest (URLs).
In the future, such a gateway could also in future be co-located 
with the home setup box/router but this would introduce a 
major security challenge as this requires to place the content 
provider certificates and manifests on the gateway.
More generally, there are two types of interception: passive 
without modification and therefore termination is optional, 
and active that need to terminate the connection to modify the 
traffic. Today, traffic interception needs to consider three 
layers: the transport (TCP/IP), the security (TLS), and the 
application (HTTP) layers. The interception type may be 
different for each of the different layers. For example, a 
transport layer active intercept may need to terminate the 
transport connection to ensure that the correct options are 
chosen, but can be protocol agnostic to any higher layer. 
However, active application layer interception would usually 
need to also intercept for the lower layers/terminate their 
connection as well. Even approaches attempting to avoid the 
necessity of full termination might have to partially fake the 
lower-layer protocol dynamics to avoid failing to split the 
connection, because a full handshake response from the server 
is a necessary input to a policy decision.
The trend to remove the separation between the security layer 
and the application layer, while improving performance and 
security, is problematic for use of transport layer intercept 
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network multicast support 
Removing the separation 
between the security and the 
application layer is 
problematic
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devices. Currently these devices are able to inspect the 
transport layer while leaving the application layer encrypted, 
either by choice (i.e., following the principle of least access) or 
for legal reasons (i.e., jurisdictions that make a distinction 
between communications metadata and payload.)
Protection and Firewalls 
A middlebox that is set up to block malicious traffic needs to 
be able to classify the traffic as malicious or benign in order to 
make a policy decision. E.g. for TLS-encrypted traffic, the 
Service Name Indicator (SNI) is often used as an early 
classifier: benign connections can be quickly ignored if it has 
been validated that it is possible rely upon the SNI (i.e., the 
SNI in a ClientHello TLS message must match a Subject 
Alternate Name (SAN) in the server certificate). Unfortunately, 
TLS 1.3 prevents transport layer passive intercept devices from 
validating the SNI, which would requiring these devices to 
intercept all sessions. Further, if the SNI is encrypted, as 
currently proposed, [ID.tls-sni-encryption], none of this 
information would be available at all. Therefore an unintended 
consequence of SNI encryption is that all traffic needs to be 
inspected, not just traffic for which an early policy decision can 
be made. This has cost and complexity implications. 
Further, as attacks on middleboxes become more likely, a 
requirement to intercept all traffic provides an additional 
attack vector. It is therefore important to understand and 
evaluate the benefits as well as costs of these kind of 
encryption decisions. As these security functions are often 
required by regulation and/or law, SNI encryption will not 
eliminate the deployment of these interception functions. It 
will simply make their use more costly. Alternatively, if proxies 
would no longer be able to inspect any traffic at all, these 
functions would need to be moved to the endpoints, at 
commensurately even higher cost of operation.
Enterprises and smaller companies often have different needs 
and perspectives to network operators. They often just block 
protocols and functions that do not match the security policy 
that they implement (e.g. UDP blocking). However, they are 
also often unaware of industry and user trends. New traffic 
patterns, that suddenly emerge and may bypass existing 
security boxes/firewalls, would be in violation of the desired 
security policy of the organization. Therefore a common 
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immediate reaction is to simply block all unknown traffic as it 
is observed (e.g., by port number, or by stripping unknown 
extensions). This general approach seeks to always “downgrade” 
to a standard/known behavior, thereby preventing the benefit 
of new features, until the in-network functions, such as 
firewalls, support them. 
As such, a policy of blocking 
uncharacterised traffic poses future 
problems by ossifying the network. New 
protocols present a need to change: 
Multipath TCP is a problem as it leads to an 
incomplete view of a flow at security 
devices that assume unipath routing. A 
simple fix to make these security devices 
multipath-aware, faces the problem that it 
is fundamentally difficult to monitor 
asymmetric and multipath routing. This is 
similar to early problems when some security devices had to 
deal with packet fragmentation, the common fix, defragment 
all packets, is fundamentally less scalable than discarding 
fragments and fixing this issue elsewhere.
Further, when more content providers begin to deploy and use 
QUIC, the downgrade reaction of simply blocking QUIC will 
work without much perceived loss of functionality. This is 
because current efforts implement a fallback to TCP. For 
example, the Chrome browser currently makes decisions of 
whether to use QUIC vs. TCP based on various information, 
including computer hardware capabilities. This masks a QUIC 
failure, and downgrading is therefore a low-risk operation. 
However, if developers later ship browsers that do not fall back 
to TCP, or new applications are deployed that only work over 
QUIC, then these applications will become inoperable. 
There is also a marketing consideration here: It would be nice 
if devices could be “fire and forget” but the reality is that this 
sort of device needs to be actively maintained to accommodate 
new protocol features. For example, on the one hand a security 
policy may wish to, or need to, ban Chrome or QUIC. On the 
other hand, employees want to use this due to advantages they 
perceive from doing so (e.g., speed, convenience, security).
The half-life of a broken or out-of-date function depends on 
the layer. Upper layer features, security features, etc, change 
quickly. However, complexity is also a consideration: Multi-
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“If you can’t understand a flow, then you 
should block the traffic. New 
techniques, even if they are possible, 
always require tooling support. This 
leads to a temporary incentive to block 
unknown traffic, until the tooling 
supports it.”
We need to replace invisible 
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layer full-stack proxies have a much longer testing and 
redeployment cycle. This is often not compatible with a desire 
for a fast upgrade cycle. The trend in removing layer separation 
in general, but specifically to security functions, makes the 
support of middlebox even more difficult and slower.
In the future, some environments could evolve protection 
services that migrate to the cloud to prevent direct access to 
remote endpoints except via the cloud service. Some client 
endpoint information could then even come directly from the 
cloud infrastructure. The local firewall would then only need to 
decide about the traffic to the trusted cloud. Also pulling logs 
directly from cloud services becomes more scalable since the 
flow information is always in one place. There are other reasons 
beyond visibility for moving security-related services to cloud 
deployments, so this could anyway happen as a side effect of 
other industry trends.
Moreover, middleboxes are not just a single-
organization operation. Currently, 
middleboxes are often configured statically, 
but increasing composability of 
middleboxes requires inter-middlebox 
communication and coordination. In the 
future, a chain of trust among the various 
boxes within and across administrative 
domains will become necessary. There is a 
need to build a mechanism for middleboxes 
to discover each other, and to determine 
whether they trust the path. Similarly, a mechanism for 
endpoints to have enough information to decide whether they 
can trust the middleboxes to use the offered in-network 
function.That means we need to replace invisible interception 
with visible interception and give the client (and server) more 
insight through which middleboxes their traffic is going.
DDoS Protection and Mitigation 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) protection is necessary 
for an operational network. This includes methods to detect 
potential DoS traffic and to divert this to dedicated scrubbing 
centres that can be used to filter out DDoS traffic while passing 
as much legitimate traffic as possible, based on various features 
extracted from the input traffic as well as reputation and 
customer policy rules. Detecting potential DoS traffic needs to 
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“We should not assume what the 
endpoint wants to do, instead let the 
endpoint tell you. If you are too 
transparent, it is hard to tell why 
something is breaking. Is the blockage 
intentional, or unintentional... So let’s 
try to make this less transparent!”
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be done locally and requires some visibility of the traffic itself. 
Detecting unusual behavior of a given traffic aggregate is 
relatively easy while the classification of traffic as legitimate or 
suspect, which is needed to make the actual delegation 
decision, is more difficult. 
It is even more challenging to mitigate distributed denial of 
service attacks in networks. Effective real-time detection of 
attack traffic in large-scale networks is generally achieved by 
combining multiple techniques in distinct phases. After the 
first phase, which detects attack traffic and segments it into 
candidate attack traffic and normal traffic, the former category 
of traffic is then presented to the second stage discriminators 
that apply more complex models to uncover attacks from a 
global perspective (i.e., whether the same attack is being 
launched at different ingress points into the network). The 
presence of pervasive encryption in modern leads makes all of 
these phases more challenging. In the absence of cleartext 
payload, at best the headers of a packet can be used for 
extracting flows and constructing complex models from the 
flows and the content of individual headers. Even this level of 
visibility of the headers is hindered when the entire packet is 
encrypted, as when using IPSec. In the worst case when the 
entire packet is encrypted, meta information like the packet 
length and inter-arrival times can be used as features to fit an 
appropriate model. 
More generally, encrypted traffic makes it challenging to 
operate real-time analytic environments, that can be used for 
DDoS detection and other troubleshooting and monitoring 
functions in a large-scale network. The traditional layering 
model of the analytic environments did not pay much attention 
to security; the simplifying assumption was that cleartext data 
was captured (perhaps through port mirroring) and then made 
available to platforms where relevant portions of the data were 
extracted to fit a model. Pervasive end-to-end encryption 
renders this model obsolete. 
Large-scale analytic environments support aggregators 
(intermediaries) that can summarise data and forward only the 
summaries to the analytic platforms. These aggregators would 
not be able to extract the data to summarise it, if the data had 
been end-to-end encrypted. 
Building learning models for encrypted traffic becomes 
therefore more challenging. One way to mitigate this is to 
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design analytic systems such that the data collectors (perhaps 
executing on remote hosts) and the models (executing on the 
analytic platforms) can be distributed and itself communicate 
over a secure channel. Aggregators, playing the role of 
intermediaries, would need access to certain portions of the 
data and prevalent techniques to allow intermediaries limited 
access to the data could be used in such cases.
While the increasing deployment of encryption up and down 
the network stack has undeniable benefits for privacy, security, 
and the evolvability of networks, it is important to consider 
and evaluate the impacts of this increased use of encryption. 
The considerations are not restricted to best practices in 
applications development, but span a range of operational and 
other issues that have come to rely upon observation of 
transport header information to deliver the services that they 
provide.
The impact of the increasing encryption of network traffic is 
on the agenda of almost every forum covering standardization 
and operational practice for the Internet and Internet-
connected networks: including the IETF, ETSI, the ITU-T, 
and 3GPP. In the IETF in particular, the discussion has focused 
on strong end-to-end encryption as the only way to enable 
privacy and security for end users, drawing on a long 
organizational tradition [RFC1984] [RFC2804] of support for 
the end-to-end principle.
There is, however, an argument for the middle. In some 
environments, the network operator may not be able fully rely 
on every single user and device to implement appropriate 
security measures. This is a common condition today in 
enterprise networks. In such scenarios, locating the security 
services in the network can scale far better than a solution 
focused on the endpoint. The tradeoff here is scalability against 
the additional risk that comes with a prominent attack surface 
presented by centralised in-network security functions.
Based on discussions at M3S, we make the following 
recommendations for network and internetwork architecture, 
the design and deployment of in-network devices, and the 
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design and deployment of future Internet transport and 
application protocols:
1. Provide for independent measurability 
when observations may be contested 
One implication of the widespread deployment of 
cryptography down the stack, as exemplified by QUIC, is the 
reduction of observability and measurability of Internet traffic. 
Information that was formerly radiated off of transport 
protocols is now easily available only to the endpoints. This 
places endpoints at an advantage with respect to observers in 
the middle. While this is the whole point of increasing 
deployment of encryption, it presents particular problems in 
cases where there is some inherent conflict between on-path 
observers and endpoints: for example, when each blames the 
other for a given performance issue.
In these cases, independent (third party) verification and 
observability of network performance is essential. This 
does not mean a reversion to cleartext to support existing 
passive measurement techniques; however, future protocol 
development should provide hooks for verifiable measurability, 
to support this independent measurement function for metrics 
and measurements likely to be in dispute.
2. Support different security associations at 
different layers for different purposes 
Integrating the transport and security layer, as QUIC does, has 
many benefits. Among these are combining transport and 
cryptographic handshakes to provide low-latency connection 
establishment and resumption; increased deployment of 
confidentiality and integrity protection because this is no 
longer an “optional” feature; and resistance to ossification that 
supports further protocol evolution. However, integrating 
protocol layers, as in QUIC, has the disadvantage of binding 
the security association used to protect the transport protocol 
with that used to protect application payload. 
While selective exposure of information is inappropriate for 
many in-network observation functions, particularly those 
concerned with security operations, it can be useful in building 
back-to-back transport proxies. Designing future integrated 
transport protocols to support multiple concurrent 
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security associations, each protecting a different part of 
the stack, when negotiated by the endpoints would 
restore some of the flexibility of the current arrangement of 
TCP over TLS, while still retaining the advantages above.
3. Replace transparent middleboxes with 
middlebox transparency 
Many of the problems caused by the widespread deployment of 
in-network functions, regardless of their purpose, arise because 
current in-network function designs have attempted to be as 
transparent as possible, in the sense of “invisible to the 
endpoints”. This makes it easier to incrementally deploy 
middleboxes, because no change is required at the endpoint, 
and no traffic is disrupted providing that endpoint protocol 
implementations do not violate the assumptions made by the 
in-network function.
Increasing encryption requires a different approach, by 
restoring control over the entities with which an endpoint 
communicates. This suggests an architectural way forward, by 
completing the transfer of power to the endpoints, even when 
middleboxes are present. How this is realised will depend on 
the use case, sometime this will be the user’s own policy 
decision, in some cases (e.g., a school, an enterprise, a shared 
computer), the security policy will be controlled by another 
party - but still needs to be known by a user.  Middlebox 
interaction with network traffic must be explicit, visible 
to the endpoints, and only performed when consent is 
granted by the security policy for both of the endpoints.
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